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Abstract:	  This	  note	  analyzes	  a	  model	  of	  endogenous	  fertility	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  financial	  market	  
assets	  and	  social	   security	  pensions.	  Given	   the	  children	  externality,	   the	   fertility	   rate	  chosen	   in	  a	  
market	   economy	   is	   too	   low	   compared	   to	   the	   Social	   Optimum,	   asking	   for	   a	   corrective	   policy.	  
Indeed,	  the	  representative	  household	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  this	  children	  externality	  which	  
leads	   to	   a	   suboptimal	   family	   size.	   We	   show	   that	   an	   optimal	   demographic	   allocation	   can	   be	  
implemented	  through	  a	  subvention	  taxation	  policy.	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1 Introduction
In the literature on population growth, two main dominant views of
reproductive motivations are identified (Dasgupta, 1993). In the first one,
children are considered as durable consumer goods. In the second one, and
particularly in developing countries, children are mainly viewed as invest-
ment goods, hence parents reproductive motivation is thus associated to
the so called old-age security hypothesis (Leibenstein, 1957). According to
the latter (Jellal, 2000; Jellal and Wolff, 2002a), in a socio-economic envi-
ronment where parents are unsure about their potential ability to support
themselves during the old age, they may rear children in the expectation of
receiving support from their children in their old age (Neher, 1971; Willis,
1980; Nerlove et al. 1987). The underlying transfer mechanism is one of
direct reciprocity driven by evolutionary cultural transmission, where par-
ents give first and children give later, without any intergenerational conflict.
Children are implicitly considered as passive agents under the control of
parents, who honor the contract loan by reimbursing their parents during
their old-age. This transfer mechanism is self-enforcing.
Indeed, in the literature explaining inter vivos transfers within the fam-
ily, Jellal and Wolff (2002b) have proposed an evolutionary cultural model of
filial altruism formation. Moving away from the altruism and exchange hy-
potheses, the authors study the endogenous altruism approach in which pri-
vate transfers are rooted in a purposeful shaping of preferences within the
family. The purpose of their paper is to analyze the motives underlying up-
stream inter vivos transfers between the generations by departing from the
traditional approach suggested by Becker (1993), based on the hypothesis of
exogenous altruism and exchange reciprocity. Jellal and Wolff (2002b) have
instead presented a model of endogenous altruism, where private transfers
are aimed at shaping preferences within the family. Rather than relying on
the so-called demonstration effect theory, they have presented a model of
cultural transmission of filial altruism in which individuals can be of two
types, altruistic or non altruistic with respect to their parents, and the prob-
ability of a child being altruistic depends positively on the amount of up-
stream care shown by parents. Mainly, they show that only the altruistic
type of preferences survives evolutionary selection, and hence the cultural
system converges in the long run to a population having kin obligations1.
Moreover, the old-age security hypothesis has been strongly supported by
many empirical studies in developing countries, either in Africa or in Asia
(Nugent, 1985). For instance, in the case of Malaysia, Raut (1996) shows that
the probability that parents will rely on the support of their children when
they are old is significantly lower for households having high income, with
1 This term refers to the obligations in terms of family responsibilities in general and espe-
cially to older relatives (filial obligations). For the use of this term see for example Hoff
and Sen (2005).
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better access to private pensions and other financial assets. Therefore, we in-
fer that, when parents consider children as investment goods, the develop-
ment of social security policy and financial markets is expected to lower fer-
tility and leads to a demographic transition. Indeed, Nugent and Gillaspy
(1983) and Entwisle and Winegarden (1984) document that the demand for
children tends to decrease with public pension programs development.
Hence, it seems that the presence of social security tends to substitute
public for private transfers as a support for old age and thus provides mo-
tivations to have fewer children. However, having few children per house-
hold creates a large negative externality on the social security pension. In-
deed, when deciding to choose optimally the size of its family, the repre-
sentative household does not take into account this externality; this behav-
ior may be harmful for the viability of a social security system in a decen-
tralized economy. Indeed, in almost all countries, the financing of public
pension systems is a pay-as-you-go plan. In this case, their financial via-
bility depends on the dependency ratio of the elderly. This ratio has ex-
perienced a sharp decline for decades and will continue to fall. According
to the medium variant of the United Nations projections, the proportion of
people aged over 60 will rise from 10.3% in 2005 to 21.8% in 2050 in the
world. In developing countries, the demographic transition will be more
severe and the ratio, for the same dates, rise from 8.1% to 20.1%. This aging
population that threatens the financial viability of pension systems has two
causes: longevity and fertility decline. According to the same projections of
the United Nations medium variant, the total fertility rate was 4.75 children
per woman in the Seventies to 2.02 in 2050. These figures are even more
alarming in developing countries over the same period as the composite
index decreased from 5.41 to 2.05.
The present note is a contribution to the endogenous fecundity theo-
retical literature. It presents a simple two-period model with endogenous
fertility and social security. Its main objective is to show that, when parents
consider children as investment goods, the family size prevailing in a mar-
ket economy is too low compared to the Social Optimum. Intuitively, when
the viability of the social security system depends on the average fertility
rate, optimizing households do not take into account this externality and,
consequently, the family size turns out to be suboptimal. Then, we show
that an appropriate taxation policy may correct this distortion and lead to
the optimal demographic allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a sim-
ple model. Section 3 analyzes the fertility choice under a market economy,
whereas the implementation of the optimal centralized fertility allocation is
presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
We consider a simple two-period model economy. Economic agents
maximize an inter-temporal utility of their current and future consump-
tions. Young agents work, earn labor wage and by filial obligation and
cultural transmission, provide an exogenous private transfer to their old
parents. Following the old-age hypothesis, we suppose that young individ-
uals rear children as investment goods. Although their fertility is costly in
terms of forgone labor income, when they become old, they receive a trans-
fer from their children. We suppose that the government subsidizes their
rearing cost by balancing its budget through a flat tax. Moreover, to be eligi-
ble for social security pension, young agents pay a proportional tax on their
labor income, which is used by the government to finance a public pension
system. Finally, young invest savings in the financial market to smooth their
consumption profile.
The representative young agent maximizes the following inter-temporal
utility function:
V = U(ct) + βU(ct+1)
where ct and ct+1 represent respectively the consumption profile in youth
and in old age for an individual born at time t; β is the standard discount
factor. This representative agent maximizes her utility, taking into consider-
ation the following budget constraints:
ct + st + Tt = wt(1 − θ −m− (1 − τ)ϕ(nt))
ct+1 = wt+1ntm+ (1 + rt+1)st + pt+1
where θ is the pension contribution fixed rate paid by all young individu-
als, mwt is the transfer to the parents, while ϕ(nt) denotes the fertility con-
vex function cost or the cost of raising nt children, which is assumed to be
subsidized at a fixed rate given by τ . st is the amount of savings and Tt
is a flat tax collected by the government to finance the granted subvention.
In the second period of her life, the representative agent receives a gross
interest factor (1 + rt+1) on her optimal savings. Further, according to the
self-enforcing old age norm, the agent receives also a fixed transfer from
each of her children wt+1ntm and a public pension of value pt+1.
The government budget constraints are shaped as follows:
Tt = τwtϕ(n¯t)
pt+1 = θwt+1n¯t
where n¯t is the ex-post optimal average fertility rate in the total population.
This represents an intra-generation externality.
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3 Fertility Under a Decentralized Market Econ-
omy
By taking factor prices, and the average number of children as given,
the representative individual of generation t chooses material consumption
over the life cycle and fertility to maximize her lifetime utility function un-
der budget constraints:
Max V = U(ct) + βU(ct+1)
ct + st + Tt = wt(1 − θ −m− (1 − τ)ϕ(nt))
ct+1 = wt+1ntm(1 + rt+1)st + pt+1
Ex-post nt = n¯t
The first-order conditions for an interior solution for savings and fertility
rate are given respectively by:
U ′(ct) = β(1 + rt+1)U ′(ct+1)
wt(1 − τ)ϕ′(nt)U ′(ct) = βmwt+1U ′(ct+1)
Proposition 1 The optimal number of children of the representative household is
given by2:
ϕ′(nt) =
wt+1
wt
m
(1 + rt+1)(1 − τ) .
Proof It is easily obtained by substituting equations (2) and (3).
Since the representative household considers children as investment good-
s, then according to Proposition 1, its optimal family size depends positively
on the return to investing in children, and thus the private transfer dictated
by filial obligation (Jellal and Wolff, 2002b), as well as the growth of wage,
but negatively on the return to its optimal saving option. Further, since the
cost of raising children is subsidized, this incentive to procreate encourages
the representative household to have more children. To conclude, depend-
ing on the extent of the taxation subvention scheme, the optimal number
of children may be too low since the household does not take into account
the children externality given by the average fertility. The availability of an
appropriate taxation policy may lead to an optimal demography which in-
ternalizes the impact of population on the sustainability of social security
pension.
4 Fertility Under a Centralized Economy
In order to the sub optimality of demography under a decentralized mar-
ket economy, we consider the fertility problem which is implemented by a
2 The proof is easily derived from the FOCs of the maximization program.
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benevolent planner. The main role of the latter is to recognize the popula-
tion externality impact on the social security system’s viability. This recog-
nition leads the planner to internalize the positive children externality and
choose the optimal fertility rate. Indeed, a benevolent planner is supposed
to maximize the representative agent‘s utility, and thus solves the following
program:
Max V = U(ct) + βU(ct+1)
ct = wt(1 − θ −m− (1 − τ)ϕ(nt)) − st − Tt
ct+1 = wt+1ntm+ (1 + rt+1)st + pt+1
Tt = τwtϕ(n¯t)
pt+1 = θwt+1n¯t
Ex-post nt = n¯t
The first-order optimal conditions for an interior solution for savings and
fertility rate are given respectively by:
U ′(ct) = β(1 + rt+1)U ′(ct+1)
wtϕ
′(nt)U ′(ct) = βwt+1(m+ θ)U ′(ct+1)
From these optimal equilibrium conditions we obtain the optimal fertil-
ity rate.
Proposition 2 The optimal number of children chosen by a social planner is given
by:
ϕ′n∗t = wt+1
wt
m+ θ
1 + rt+1
We observe immediately that the fertility rate arising in a centralized
economy differs from that chosen in a decentralized economy. Therefore,
now, the optimal number of children depends on the fixed rate of pension
contribution given: the higher this contribution, the higher number of chil-
dren.
Given this first best allocation, we now examine how the government
can use the available taxation policy to achieve the social optimum.
Proposition 3 There exists a tax-subvention scheme leading to the optimal fertility
rate. This tax amounts to:
τ∗ = θ
m+ θ
We observe that the optimal tax subvention rate only depends on the
transfers’ parameters, either those within the family or those provided by
social security pension. Moreover, the optimal tax is raised by the social
security contribution rate and lowered by the size of private transfers within
the family.
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5 Conclusion
In this note we have analyzed a simple model of endogenous fertility in
the presence of financial market assets and social security pensions. Given
the presence of a children externality, the fertility rate chosen in a market
economy is too low in the absence of corrective policy. Indeed, the rep-
resentative household does not take into account this children externality
which leads to a suboptimal family size. We have finally shown that an
optimal demographic allocation exists and can be implemented through a
subvention taxation policy.
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